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Despite the apparent fluidity that characteries this historical moment
as well as this moment in legal scholarshio, this paper argues that
there is also an enduring tjgidiy that isfound in the persistence of a
modernist conception of law. It is revealed in debates surrounding
transnational constitudonaism, which even as they purport to transcend
the nation-state, cannot escape some forms of reinscrption of the relation
between law and a centraked sovereign aathority.
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Introduction
In the world as seen through the lens of globalization, speeded up,
networked, and restlessly materialist, revisiting 'foundational' questions of legal
theory might first appear to be a hopelessly marginal and archaic exercise. Yet,
these questions have become more, not less, relevant and pressing in the current
context. In our world, as we have come to understand it, images, goods,
technology finance, and people are linked in a vast network of trans-border
exchange relations, a global market, which (we are told) threatens to destabilize
and supercede the sovereign authority of nation-states.
* Ruth Buchanan is an Associate Professor of Law at Osgoode Hall Law School. She
wishes to thank Peter Fitzpatrick for useful feedback.
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This threat (perceived or real) to the nation-state is experienced as
profoundly destabilizing, as the nation-state is the paradigmatic form in which
law and politics have been imagined in modernity. That this is the case,
despite (or perhaps because of) the. fact that the form can be traced to a
particular 'conception of the state-society relation, born within the parochial
history of Western Europe [being] made universal' is perhaps an indication
of how little the structure of the global system has changed since colonial
times.' The ostensible challenge to the nation-state posed by globalization
has compelled public and scholarly debates in the west to revisit the
longstanding (and perhaps irresolvable) questions of the foundations of legal
authority. Contemporary efforts to re-imagine sovereignty 'beyond the
nation-state' have opened a Pandora's box of questions regarding the very
nature of law, the sources of law's legitimacy, and the relationship
between legal and political authority. What is less clear, however, is whether
these reconsiderations will reflexively incorporate the insights of postcolonial
scholars regarding the parochial origins of these ostensibly 'constitutive'
discourses.
Herein lies the danger of current developments. To the extent that the
phenomenon of globalization is reframed as a 'problem' of legal theory, I would
argue, it becomes a problem whose 'solution' is already determined by the
existent parameters of a particular discourse (of legal theory).2 One can see this
most tellingly in the context of debates over 'constitutionalism' in the
transnational context, where the often invisible 'touch of stateness' is
acknowledged to be pervasive. Indeed, many of the advocates for transnational
constitutionalism are unapologetic about their adherence to an established
'vocabulary' or canon of conceptions that 'has undergone centuries of
PARTrA CHAITERJEB, THE NATION AND ITS FRAGMENTS: COLONIAL AND POST COLONIAL
HIsToRIES, 238 (1993).
2 Klaus Gunther, Legal Pluralism and the Univerral Code of Legaliy: Globakisaeion as a
Problem of 14al Theoy (2003), unpublished manuscript, http://wwwaw.nyuLedu/clppt/
program2003/readings/gunther.pdf (last visited September 27, 2004).
See generally, J. Shaw & A. Weiner, The Paradox of the European PokY, in STATE THE
EUROPrAN UNION 5: RisKs, REFORM, RFsIsTANCE AND REvIVAL (M. Green Cowles &
M. Smith eds, 2000).
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development and refinement within the context of the state'.4 Admittedly, the
post-national constitutionalism debate has germinated in the hothouse of the
debates over constitutionalization of the European Union, where 'normative
assumptions about the utility of constitutional thinking in the promotion of order,
justice and civility in society and polities, even (perhaps particularly) beyond the
bonds of the national state' may indeed be 'practically inescapable'.5 The debate
has by no means remained confined to its original range, however. To bend the
botanical analogy a bit more, one could suggest that the discourse of post-national
constitutionalism has behaved more like an invasive species, proliferating wildly
in locations where it did not originate, and where it faces no natural competitors.
One finds what I would identify as 'constitutional' approaches to questions
of the relationship between 'legitimacy' and 'legality' beyond the nation-state
in a broad swath of contemporary scholarship, from the modernist constitutional
scholars referred to above to explicitly 'postmodern' treatments of global ordering.
While scholars such as Hardt and Negri approach these questions in terms of a
paradigmatic shift towards post-modern forms of social, legal and political ordering,
the central preoccupations with law and politics, legality and legitimacy remain in
place. Hardt and Negri set out to examine the 'constittion' of a new supranational
world power they call Empire, framing their undertaking in terms of a 'global
constitutionaksm'.6 While Hardt and Negri critique the use of the 'domestic analogy'
as a methodological tool for the analysis of supranational forms of ordering, they
offer up their own conception of 'Empire' as a postmodern avatar of sovereignty,
an emergent supranational juridical formation that corresponds to the 'totalizing'
social and economic processes currently at work in the world. The (western)
juridical problematic remains in place, albeit elevated to a new level?
4 Neil Walker, The EU and the ITTO: Consditionaism in a New Ky, in THE EU AND THE
WTO: LEGAL AND CONsTrmUTONAL IssuEs, 33 (G. de Burca & J. Scott eds., 2001).
5 Jo Shaw, Process and Constiturional Disourse in the European Union, 27 J. Lw & Soc. 4, 7
(2000).
a MICHAEL. HARDT & ANToNio NErlu, Ewnua 7 (2001).
1 See generally, Ruth Buchanan & Sundhya Pahuja, Legal Impeialism: Eipire's Invisible
Hand?, in EMPIRE's Naw CiYTHEs: READING HAROT AND NEalu (Paul A. Passavant
and Jodi Dean eds., 2004).
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So, despite the apparent fluidity that characterizes this historical moment
as well as this moment in legal scholarship, there is also an enduring rigidity, the
persistence of certain kinds of constraints on our capacity to imagine legal
forms. These constraints infect a broad range of seemingly disparate discussions,
such that even those who herald this as a moment of (postmodern) transition
are unwittingly caught up in the reproduction of the 'modern' form of law. It
seems as if there truly is 'no way out of the (universal) code of legality'.' This
is the dilemma with which I (immodestly) propose to grapple in this article.
In what follows, I argue that although constitutional approaches, broadly
conceived, purport to help us cope with the challenge to law presented by
globalization, they do so by implicitly reinforcing a limited and limiting approach
to transnational legality. Against this backdrop, the paper will present legal
pluralism as an alternative approach by which one might examine shifts in the
practices of regulation in a globalizing world without prejudging the question
of legal form. I articulate my approach to 'legal pluralism' by distinguishing it
from 'constitutional' or political pluralism. The former finds within the current
moment an opportunity to radically re-conceive of the production of
transnational legalities outside or beyond the hierarchies and exclusions that
have marked both the modern nation-state and the history of the interstate
system, while the latter is constrained by a continued dependence on the
institutionalized forms of law and nation. Thus, while constitutional pluralism
is an approach the aim of which is to accommodate difference, it fails to foster
plurality.
In contrast, then, with what I have (broadly) identified as 'constitutional'
approaches, including those identified with 'constitutional pluralism', this article
will propose that legal pluralism, as a metaphor, a frame, or a style of legal
thinking, might provide a more productive avenue through which to approach
the pressing issues of law's inclusivity and legitimacy in the transnational realm.
This remarkable moment, in which legal theory is not 'boring' but rather an
a Gunther Teubner, 'Global Bakowina: Legal Plumlism in World Sociey', in GioosAi Law
WITHOUT A STmT 3, 16 (Joerges, Sand and Teubner eds., 1997).
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intensely engaging and salient 'activity that participates in the life of its object"
presents an opportunity for legal scholars to pariapate in the emergence of new
forms of transnational legality The extent to which we are capable of re-
imagining the 'form' of law will make a significant difference to the fate of
various emergent legalities; which will be nurtured and which suppressed.
Post-National Constitutionalism
Many have argued persuasively that in current times, it has become
necessary to re-imagine both politics and law in a post-national frame. The
quest for a 'post-national' constitutionalism has emerged in response to the
perceived 'deficits' of governance at the transnational level: of democracy,
legitimacy, accountability. It is a response that seeks to draw on the deep well
of signification that constitutional discourse carries in the west. As Neil Walker
observes, "the normatively continuous idea of constitutionalism is linked in a
powerful and resilient chain of signification to a whole series of core governance
values- democracy, accountability, equality, separation of powers, rule of law
and fundamental rights."1' For this reason, however, discussions of transnational
governance seeking to draw on its rich legacy can also suffer from a degree of
ambiguity. That is, the language of constitutionalism can be mobilized in different
registers (institutional or theoretical), for dramatically opposing ends, by a range
of differently situated actors who may nonetheless labor under the illusion that
they are joining in a common debate."
The debates over the turn to constitutionalism at the World Trade
Organization are illustrative in this respect. Sparked by the institution's 'crisis
of legitimacy' following the well-publicized failure of the Seattle Ministerial,
which was attended both by internal dissension and noisy public protests, articles
MARGARPT Diwvas, ASING THE Lv QUESTION: THE DissoiUoN or LEGAl.. THEORY,
3 (2" ed., 2002).
'Walker, supra note 4, at 344.
" D. Z. Cass, The 'Consdiudonaiaion' of Internaional Trade Law Judicial Norm Generation




advocating constitutionalization of the WTO have proliferated in recent years.1 2
This growing attraction of constitutionalism as an explanatory framework for
current and anticipated developments in the international trading regime has
been attributed to a myriad of factors. In the first instance, constitutional theory
conventionally provides an account of the political foundations of legitimate
legal authority, frequently called for in the WTO context. Secondly, the 'hands-
tying' quality of constitutionalism appeals to advocates of a liberalized global
trading order, such as Ernst Ulrich Petersmann, who see its benefits threatened
by the potential capture of the domestic political process in member-states by
various special interests.13 But as well, constitutional discourse is increasingly
understood as a framework within which competing normative claims, such as
those of a growing chorus of non-state or civil society actors, are balanced and
accommodated and hence, appeals to the constituency focused on the range of
'trade and...' concerns; environment, labor and development, for example. 4 In
this way, constitutional discourse in the WTO context seems to offer all things
to all people: it first grounds WTO law in political legitimacy, then sets it above
the fray of politics, all the while promising a dispassionate arena for the fair
resolution of fundamental normative disagreements.
This paper, however, seeks to move beyond the engaged institutional
politics of transnational governance to consider the turn to constitutionalism
in another 'key', that of legal theory." While jurisprudential inquiry is rarely
an explicit part of contemporary discussions of 'post-national' governance,
I would argue, it is almost always a significant part of what is going on. To
this end, we might profitably pursue a further consideration of the
12 The scholarly debate over WTO constitutionalization is expansive, and I don't purport
to comprehensively survey it here. Some key interventions, however, include Cass,
2001, Petersmann, 2000, Howse and Nicolaidis, 2003, Krajewski, 2001, de Burca
and Scott, 2001.
1 See generally, Ernst-Ultich Petersmann The WTO Consitutdon and Human Rights, 3J. INT. Ec. L. (2000).
t4 See generally, Martin Krajewski, Demoratic Legidmay and Consdtiional Perspecves of
WTO Law, 35 J. Wouso TRAM 167 (2001).
i For another, more ambitious, use of this musical metaphor, see JAMEs Tuu.Y, PuBuc
PHILosoPHY IN A Nny Ky, VoL. I AND 11 9 (2008).
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'constituent complicities' between sovereignty and law that lie beneath the
constitutional narratives of law's foundation first within, and now, beyond
the nation-state.1'
In purporting to ground legal authority in a founding act of political will,
constitutional theory appears to offer a type of 'practical' solution to the 'thorny
issues of the non-foundational foundations of law.'" A constitution is essentially
an originary narrative that purports to unify and authorize both legal and political
authority." As such, it cannot avoid the paradox, as Fitzpatrick so elegantly
puts it, that "the origin has to 'be' before and after the point of origination."" A
constitution, in order to found legal authority, does so by purporting to ground
that authority in the political will of a 'people' understood to be capable of
acting as a unified entity. But, the 'people' cannot come into existence as such
until after the founding inaugurated by the constitution. Hence, the constitutional
'moment' must be understood as a sort of 'pious fiction'. 0 It necessarily presumes
a pre-existing political order at the same time as it brings it into existence.
"Constitutional law and discourse are no mere reflections of a prior political
order, but are recursively implicated in the elaboration of that order".' This
'political order' (simultaneously presumed and called into existence by the
constitution) is also the source of sovereignty both for modern law and the
modem nation.
It should be becoming evident by now that the assertion that in the
constitution of sovereign nation-states we find the 'foundations' of modern
law cannot be taken, as it frequently is in constitutional debates, as a claim
16 Peter Fitzpatrick, American Empire and the Rule of (International) Law, 16 LEIDEN J.
INn.. L. 429, 431 (2003).
"7 Gunther Teubner, Societal Condatitionalimr. Alternaiver to State-Centered Constitdional
Theory?, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 3, 16 (Joerges,
Sand and Teubner eds., 2004).
is On law's originary narratives generaly see the contributions to S. Pahuja and J.L.
Beard, 2004. Also, Buchanan and Johnson, 2005.
" Peter Fitzpatrick, Breaking the Unify of the World: Saage Soores and Feminine Law, 19
AuSTRAuAN FEMINIST L. J 47 (2003).
" H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw%', 150 (1961).
21 Walker, sapra note 4, at 39.
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regarding either the verisimilitude or immutability of that founding. Rather, it
is the failure of those ostensible foundations that has become the subject of
jurisprudential inquiry. In this vein, much of the recent work of Peter Fitzpatrick,
among others, has revealed for us in careful and illuminating detail the impossibly
commingled mythic foundations of law, nation and sovereignty in modernity.
And along these lines, I have argued elsewhere that law and nation are bound
together by a mutual 'deferral' of foundational authority; "Law requires the
nation-state to serve as the ultimate source of its authority, while at the same
time, nation-states cannot come into being without law." It is true that law and
nation are together fundamental to constitutional discourse, but not in the ways
that constitutional scholars often imagine.
In conventional accounts, the primary challenge of the project of finding
or creating a 'ground' for law beyond the nation-state thus is often represented
in terms of the need to escape the 'touch of stateness', the (misleading) analogy
with municipal or state law. This is based on an old but enduring contrast
drawn between law's posited existence in the municipal realm and its deficient
and tenuous existence in the international." If, as I have suggested, municipal
law draws this perception of both autonomy and stability from its 'constituent
complicity' with nation, international law need not be understood as suffering
from any particular 'lack' in regard to the matter of foundation. That is, in both
the national and transnational contexts, the self-justifying narrative of law's
foundations, the process of the 'bootstrapping' of legal authority, unfolds (and
fails) in essentially the same way. That is, the law must rely on some notion
of a pre-existing 'community' from which it draws its authority. That community,
however, whether it is 'national' or 'international', can only be constituted as a
'whole' by the demarcation of it that law brings about in its originary
(constitutional) moment. This is why we frequently hear invocations of an
'international community' (sometimes in the guise of global civil society)
intended to provide a legitimating 'ground' for law beyond the state. 24
22 See generally, PETER FrrxrrnicK, MODERNISM AND THE GRouNns or LAw (2001).
23 See eneral, H.L.A. HAR, THa CoNcsrr oF LAW (1961).
24 See eserally, Buchanan and Pahuja, rnpm note 7.
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And the turn to post-national constitutionalism is an extension of the same
logic. The problem is, of course, that what is being presumed by these
invocations is precisely the thing that must be thereby called into being. In this
way, constitutional discourse itself takes the place, or rather, makes up, the
sought after 'grounds' of law in both the national and international realms.
Not all of the advocates for a 'constitutionalization without the state',
however, begin from the assumptions that law's autonomy and authority are
definitively secured 'within' the state and that international law must be defined
in contrast, through its lack. Rather, some scholars have started with an
acknowledgement of the continuities between domestic and international law,
and focused on the extent to which the world of transnational law and politics
already displays many constitution-like qualities.' Here, the self-constituting
or 'reflexive' nature of constitutional discourse is not only acknowledged, but
emphasized." That is, the 'process of mutual constitution and containment' of
law and politics is acknowledged as a necessary, indeed defining, feature of
constitutionalism. 2 7 As Gunther Teubner puts it, "The point is continually to
understand the paradoxical process in which any creating of law always already
presupposes the rudimentary elements of its own constitution, and, at the same
time, constitutes these only through their implementation". This paradoxical
relation is what holds law and politics, necessarily, both together and apart,
5 Although my primary references in this section are to Neil Walker and Gunther
Teubnet, my aim here is to draw a more general outline or 'ideal type' of approach
that would appear sympathetic to a range of scholars currently working on issues of
transnational governance from a pluralist constitutional perspective from Jo Shaw to
James Tully. Further, it goes without saying that Walker and Teubner represent very
different theoretical traditions, but in juxtaposing them in this way, I aim to illustrate
the rather broad appeal of the 'reflexive constitutionalist' approach.
26 Teubner, .rupra note 17, at 16.
27 Walker, supra note 4, at 34; Walker puts it this way, "Politics-in the grounded sense of
the affairs of a polity-could not be conceived of without a cansitive legal setting
and framework. Yet, on the other hand, constitutional law always pesupposed some
prior political setting-in the double sense of requiring a pre-existing political context
for its mobilization and sustenance and re-imagining that political context... in its
narrative of origins": Neil Walker, The Idea of Constitulional Plraism, 65 MOD. L.
Rxv. 317, 340 (2002).
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enabling and constraining each.' The task remaining for legal scholars, then,
with respect to post-national constitutionalism is to identify and catalogue the
aspects of evolving transnational legal regimes in terms of various
'constitutional' indices, including the emergence of hierarchically ordered norms,
processes for self-review or interpretive autonomy, mechanisms for democratic
representation or 'voice' and notably, the existence of a self-reflective
constitutional discourse.
But this pragmatic embrace of the paradoxical nature of law's foundations,
an insight already central to much contemporary legal theorizing, does not yet
answer the question: what is sought to be achieved by the turn to the language
of constitutionalism? It is here that the project of post-national constitutionalism
is revealed as a normative, and not merely descriptive, undertaking. Refraining
public and scholarly debates in constitutional terms, for these scholars, contains
the potential to transform the ongoing process of transnational juridification in
such a way as to bring into being the conditions for legitimate
constitutionalization that are currently lacking. As Walker puts it, "...in the
final analysis the ideological dimension of constitutional politics... is not the
enemy of a normative discourse of responsible self government but rather its
necessary accompaniment, and indeed, a central part of its generative context.2?
For Teubner, it is to 'guarantee the chances of articulating so-called non-rational
logics of action against the dominant social rationalization trend, by conquering
areas of autonomy for social reflection in long-lasting conflicts, and
institutionalizing them"." Both Walker and Teubner, albeit from within quite
different theoretical models, appear to be basing the argument for
constitutionalism on a belief in the salutary effects of constitutional discourse
itself. In the end, this approach rests on the hope that constitutionalism will
"(open) up a richer and more productive normative debate".
28 In the language of systems theory, "long term structural linkages of sub-system
specific structures and legal norms are set up.... The important effect of structural
linkage is that it restrains both-the legal process and the social process-in their
possibilities of influence." Teubner, supra note 17, at 20.
29 Walker, sipra note 4, at 53.
'" Teubner, supma note 17, at 13.
Walker, sura note 4, at 54.
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Of course, the desire to 'open up a richer debate' still begs the question of
what is to be debated. That is, to return to the objection registered at the
outset, to what extent do even reflexive constitutional approaches pre-
determine the parameters within which transnational legality must take
shape? Two tendencies are of concern here. Firstly, there is the way in
which a call for constitutionalism is responsive to the discourse of 'deficits'
mentioned earlier. That is, constitutional discourse is posited as a
supplement, something that will supply 'more' of whatever is currently
'lacking' in transnational legality; democracy, accountability, legitimacy, or
even, self-reflexive constitutional discourse itself. Relatedly, the call for
constitutionalism implies both a hierarchy and a trajectory of transnational
legali ties, in which some emerging legal forms are imagined as more complete
(constitution-like) than others. This trajectory, which might be said to
parallel to the developmental hierarchy of states in the Westphalian order,
has the effect of privileging certain legal forms, such as judicial
norm-generation, over others." Further, constitutional debates tend to focus
on highly formalized and juridified entities such as the EU and the
WTO, while an entity such as the World Social Forum, devoted to broadening
and democratizing the public debate over transnational norms, is virtually
ignored.
How is it then, that what I am calling 'reflexive constitutionalism' can also
be identified with a concern for fostering plurality, such that it is sometimes
identified as 'constitutional pluralism'?" Along with the focus on
constitutionalism's autogenic quality there is an emphasis in this approach on
the capacity of the 'constitutional' form to remake itself in a number of different
ways. That is, this view suggests that constitutionalism can be 'disaggregated'
into its component parts or indices, which can then be re-assembled in a number
of different ways. Even the notion of 'sovereignty' is disaggregated and
pluralized within this conception. 4
" Cass, supra note 11, at 39.




This formal or institutional pluralism is accompanied by another sense of
pluralism, a recognition of the need to accommodate, within these various
constitutionalisms, a diverse political landscape. That is, it connects with an
"aspirational constitutional discourse which seeks to reshape the traditional
intra-state constitutional sphere of the relations between different groups...
within the state in ways which go beyond those legal forms of identity politics...
that can be comfortably accommodated within the existing constitutional
framework and ethos".5
In other words, reflexive post-national constitutionalism seeks to be more
radically accommodating of plurality than various models of 'multicultural'
constitutionalism at the municipal level have achieved. The means under
consideration for the political pluralization of constitutionalism are themselves
abundant, and beyond the scope of this article to assay. It must be pointed out,
however, that at a certain point, the requirements of 'inclusivity' seems to demand
of cons titutionalism an impossible 'reflexivity'.36 That is, it is the function of a
constitution to represent a collectivity as a sovereign political subject.
This representation is also an act of creation, a calling into presence, as the
sovereign subject of law cannot exist prior to the moment it is 'constituted'.
The constitution of a political subject, then, is also a moment of closure, of
containment, and hence, exclusion. It is difficult to imagine how transnational
constitutionalism, however plural or inclusive it aspires to become, can avoid
this necessary implication.
In this regard, there is a further approach to constitutionalism, articulated
most clearly by James Tully, that must be considered. Tully's 'agonistic
cons titutionalism' takes the dual requirements of reflexivity and plurality to
their logical endpoints, potentially stretching the constitutional frame beyond
recognition. He locates irreducible disagreement, even and perhaps especially
over the rules of recognition or the rules of the rules, at the heart of the
" Walker, .rapra note 33, at 317.
16 Emilios Christodoulidis, ConstituionalIrresoladon: Law and the Framing of Civil Sociqp, 9
Elu. L. J. 401, 409 (2003).
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constitutional arrangement, rejecting any notion of 'consensus' in favor of
'continuously conciliated order'.3
While Tully's account deserves far more consideration than I can give it
here, I use it to illustrate the point at which we encounter most starkly the limits
of the institutionalized form of constitutional discourse in relation to the
demands of plurality. Tully doesn't seek to minimize or contain the challenge
presented by pluralism, but rather seeks to deepen his own and our understanding
of the 'density of relations of exclusion and assimilation' currently at work in
the world." Most significantly, I think, in contrast to the majority of the debate
over 'post-national constitutionalism' that I have sought to engage in this essay,
he explicitly relocates the site of scholarly engagement away from 'the formalized
institutions of deliberation' to the 'practices of and for democratic freedom
(that) irrupt in opposition to (exclusions) in a multiplicity of nodes and networks
and around a multiplicity of issues'."
In many ways, Tully's approach seems more in sympathy with both the
tenor and intent of my own turn to legal pluralism than with the general outline
of post-national constitutionalism that I have articulated thus far. It might also
be observed here that Tully's approach shares some affinities with that of Hardt
and Negri in Empire. Hardt and Negri identify their project as about the formation
of a new globalcondttion; "In constitutional terms, the processes of globalization
are no longer merely a fact but also a source of juridical definitions that tends to
project a single supranational figure of political power". In contrast with
modernist approaches, Hardt and Negri acknowledge that the constitutional
framework of Empire is marked by a series of 'explosive aporias' at its center.
These 'aporias' represent the total absence of consensus (even imagined,
projected or hoped for) concerning fundamental juridical questions of legitimacy,
justice, and political order." In this sense, Hardt and Negri raise the same question
37 See general#, James Tully, The Unfreedom of the Moderns in Comparison to Their Ideals of
Costtsional Democray, 65 MoD. L. REv. 204 (2002).
3 Id.
39 Tully, sapra note 37, at 65.
4 HARDT & NEGRm, supra note 6, at 20.
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of the limits of constitutionalism that Tully does. Does it make sense to continue
speaking of a constitutional framework when the central characteristic of the
framework in question is a radical indeterminacy? While I welcome the
acknowledgements of reflexivity and plurality found in these latter approaches,
I wonder about the perceived need to continue operating within a discourse of
constitutionalism, and what irruptive potential these contributions could have
that might be thereby contained.
Transnational Legal Pluralism
Our understandings of legal order are an integral part of the complex world
of language, myth and metaphor in which we live and seek to make meaning.1
I have suggested some ways that the enduring constitutional myth, through
which law and political community perennially founds itself, might inflect the
meanings we make of transnational legal orders in certain ways. Without
purporting to be advancing anything resembling a developed 'theory', in this
final section of the paper, I wish to modestly propose 'legal pluralism' as an
alternative metaphor for thinking about transnational legality. It should be clear
that my effort here needs to be clearly distinguished from the various theories
of legal pluralism as debated by legal scholars, especially those in the fields of
anthropology and sociology of law. Further, and in relation to a more recently
popularized debate, 1 am not advancing legal pluralism as a theory that is
particularly well adapted to, or even compelled by, an analysis of emerging
'global' legal phenomena.43
Rather, I rerely seek to speculate about what implications a metaphoric
shift in our capacity to imagine legal forms, from 'constituted' to 'pluralist',
might have. Of course, in order to do this, I need to first articulate more carefully
41 See generally, Robert Cover, Nosos and Naratim, 97 HARV. L. Rav. 4 (1983).
42 For a usceful recent reconsideration of the literature on legal pluralism, see MvuJssAlus,
2004.
4 See generally, Teubner, .upra note 8; See also: Francis Snyder, Governinj Economic
Globalization: Global Leal Pllim and Euopean Law, 5 ut. L. J. 334 (1999).
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what might be envisioned by such a shift. As a 'metaphor of multiplicity', a
legal pluralist approach suggests a number of points of departure from
mainstream constitutional accounts of law. It departs from the view that law is
necessarily formal and can be institutionally identified with state action. It
does not identify law exclusively with posited rules, distinct and territorially
defined. And finally, it does not rely on a dichotomous construction of law and
society (or politics)." In the place of the clearly delineated and identifiable
form of law situated within the bounds of constitutional theory, we find in
legal pluralism a view of law (including transnational law) as emerging from a
plethora of often competing normative frameworks."
In contrast to the unifying image of the constitutional moment, the legal
pluralist imaginary encompasses multiplicity, heterarchy, and diversity. Legal
pluralism allows us to think about the possibility for transnational legality without
a 'center' or normative hierarchy. That is, the relationship between emergent
transnational regulatory regimes need not be reduced to a necessary relation of
superior/inferior as judged by the extent to which they are more or less 'legal' or
'constitutional'. Rather, they can be understood in a variety of ways: overlapping,
discrete, competing, interpenetrated, mutually constitutive. In this way, the
public discussion about the emergence and evolution of transnational legal norms
is opened up to include a much wider range of formal and informal, institutional
and discursive mechanisms."
One way in which debates within a legal pluralist frame might be more
inclusive is in the way in which they envision the participation of global civil
society. Within contemporary debates in international law, belief in an already
existing 'international community' appears as a necessary fiction.47 That is
4 Roderick MacDonald, Metaphors of Mulzicidy: Civil Sodey Regimes and Legal Pluraism,
15 ARiz. J. INTr.. & Comp. L. 69, 74 (1998).
4 lbid at 73.
4 See general, OREN PEREz, ECOLOGICAL SENsiTIvrry AND GLOBAL LEGAL PLURAUSM:
RETHINKING THE TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT CONPIICT (2004); Oren Perez, Normaive
Creaiviy and Global Legal Pluraism: Releions on the Deoerade Critique of Transuadonal
Law, 10 INDIANA J. GLoasi. LEGAL STUDIEs 25 (2003).
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because in mainstream approaches, the legal/political subject (here, civil society)
can only be constituted, or 'called forth' by being 'called into line'.48 To put
it another way, the 'international community' of international law is a
container that has determinate contours. For civil society to be contained
within it, it must be made to fit. Those parts of civil society that do not fit,
the 'irruptive' bits, are simply lopped off. For the legal pluralist, in contrast,
it is the civil society that shapes the legal/political container, as much as
the reverse. So, the presence or absence of shared normative frameworks
becomes the very subject of inquiry. While much work has been done to
more fully integrate the reconsideration of questions of recognition and
participation into constitutional approaches, the risk of dealing with these
issues in constitutional terms is that they will become just another institutional
design problem; another procedural detail to be worked out by the
institutional engineers of the global legal order. Yet, in the legal pluralist
frame, the answers to such questions are not pre-given. Institutional
frameworks, the meaning of participation and the sources of legitimacy can
and likely will be multiple, contestable, and evolving
Conclusion
As may have already become clear, there are important distinctions between
this formulation of legal pluralism and the debates over the importance of and
the need to account for political pluralism, which usually take place within a
constitutional frame.
"Legal pluralism actually rests on almost the opposite intellectual
presuppositions to political (democratic) pluralism. Far from
simply acknowledging ethnocultural pluralism as a social fact
and designing political institutions dependent upon a concept
of abstract citizenship to accommodate it within a monist legal
political order, legal pluralism is a radically heterogeneous
4 See generally, Buchanan & Pahuja, supra note 7.
45 Christodoulilis, impra note 36, at 426.
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concept. The plurality is not just of citizens, it is a plurality of
legal orders as well-each operative within the same social space
and each one of which exists independently of the others"."
The distinction between political pluralism and legal plurality is crucial.
Political pluralisms, despite their ostensible embrace of political diversity may
actually function to contain, even undermine, the recognition of legal pluralism
by an implicit reliance on both a unitary conception of law and a correspondingly
clear distinction between the 'legal' and 'political' realms.
This can usually be seen to happen in one of two ways. Oren Perez has
described the first variant of this as the 'Westphalian' approach, in which politics
are seen as confined to the national level, while the work of international
institutions is imagined as primarily legal and technical in nature."0 This approach
is a relatively common argument advanced by those who seek to keep pluralist
politics 'out' of the WTO, for example.5 But even constitutionally pluralist
approaches that seek to integrate the accommodation of political pluralism
directly into transnational law and institutions frequently invoke a centrist, rather
than pluralist, conception of law,
An example is found in the approach adopted by de Burca and Walker, 2 in
their role as editors of a collection of essays on the topic of 'Law, Civil Society
and Transnational Economic Governance'. In their account, although they
acknowledge the multiple discourses of civil society in careful detail, law is
represented as a 'central steering mechanism': "One general and overarching
question concerns the possibilities and limits of the role of law, in its institutional
49 Roderick MacDonald, Metaphors of Mulkflicly: Civil Socie, Regimes and 1eal Plarasm,
15 Aiz. J. INTn. & Comp. L. 69, 76 (1998).
5o Seegeneral, Oren Perez, Normaive Creadiiy and Global Legal Plvralism: Reflections on the
Democrade Critique of Trausnaional Law, 10 INDIANA J. GLoBAl. LEGAL STUDiEs 25
(2003).
SI Robert Howse, From Poliies to Technocrary -And Back Again: The Fate of the Maltilateral
Trading Regime, 96 Am. J. INTL. L. 94 (2002).
52 Grainne de Burca & Neil Walker, Law and Transnaional Civil Sociely: Upsetting the
Agenda?, 9 Eo. L. J. 387 (2003).
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and discursive specificity, within the post national setting... does law, as a central
steering mechanism, inevitably organize civil society in such a way as to reduce
its autonomy?"." The way the question is posed here, I would argue, prefigures
its answer. If law is conceived as both centralized and autonomous, that is, an
institutionalized realm of 'coordination' that is separate from politics, it~is hard to
imagine it as capable of facilitating the multiple and diverse politics currently being
advanced in the international realm by contemporary global civil society actors.
In contrast, the metaphor of legal plurality facilitates a reflexive approach
to the relationship between law and politics in the international realm. That is,
law provides a fluid and evolving space and discourse within which competing
normative claims are debated, engaged, negotiated and compromised. Law and
politics are not imagined as discrete realms of activity, with law in the driver's
seat, as it were. Rather, they are tied together in a mutual relation of 'constituent
complicity'. From within this perspective, we can consider how new
instantiations of transnational political practice, such as those exemplified by
various transnational movements for global social justice over the past decade,
might influence the form of transnational legal regimes, as well as the converse.
Global civil society exists and operates from within relatively more
'disorganized' and 'organized' manifestations, yet a focus on its relation to more
'constitution-like' legal forms such as the World Trade Organization will tend
to highlight the activities of the relatively more organized nongovernmental
organizations, and those activities in particular that are specifically directed
towards the 'constitution' of that institution." The 'metaphor of multiplicity'
suggests that law is not only or necessarily imagined in this way, as the necessary
'institutional' container of an unruly and disruptive 'politics' that is 'prior' to
law but must be authorized by it. The form of law itself needs to also be
understood in its more 'disorganized' form, as potentially plural, disruptive,
subject to re-conceptualization and transformation. This is not to say that
n Ibid at 389.
5 Christodoulidis, supra note 36, at 401; Ruth Buchanan, Perpetual Peace or Perpetual
Process: Global Giil Soey and Cosmopoltan Legaly ai the World Trade Organisakon, 16
L1DN J. Mi.. L. 673 (2003).
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unitary, or constitutional, conceptions of law are somehow false, however.
Rather, my intent has been to elaborate upon the metaphor of legal plurality in
response to what I have perceived as a dominant tendency towards unified,
constitutional representations of law.
I do, however, believe that this moment in which the foundational questions
of law, questions concerning the 'authority of authority', seem to once again be
open to consideration, presents an opportunity. Allowing ourselves to re-imagine
transnational legal institutions and the politics surrounding them with the
metaphor of legal plurality, I argue, might allow us to perceive emerging forms
of 'global' law, perhaps from unexpected places. The authors of these new forms
of global law could well be those 'critical beings', those who, like refugees or
illegal migrants, find themselves occupying the most inhospitable and interstitial
spaces of the transnational order, and who are denied the protection of a settled
or determinate law. Like these new 'global subjects', new forms of 'global law'
could well emerge from a myriad of marginal, improbable or discredited sources.
Law holds out a promise to the world of both plurality and inclusivity, a
dual promise that we must continue to seek to realize in the transnational realm,
even as its failures are more poignantly clear than ever. As legal theorists,
although we may not be able to change the world or its laws, we can choose the
metaphors through which we represent them. Metaphor is one means by which
we can continue to insist upon the necessity of opening up for questioning the
extent to which current forms and frameworks of transnational law realize our
aspirations for it. This opening to questioning is a 'permanent task', one that
perennially refuses any determinate settlement of the question of the foundations
of legal authority."
3 Peter Fitzpatrick and Patricia Tuitt, Inrodction, in CRITICAL BINGS: LAW, NAnoN
AND THE GoBAL LEGAL SUBECT 11 (Peter Fitzpatrick & Patricia Tuitt eds., 2004).
* The phrase 'permanent task' is James Tully's. Although I have raised questions about
his adherence to a language and framework of cons titutionalism, I concur with his
elegant formulation of our social and legal order as a permanent work in progress;
've are always in the position of beginning again the permanent task of testing the
limits of our freedom by means of our freedom'.
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